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"IF BLACK IS SO SPECIAL, THEN WHY ISN'T
IT IN THE RAINBOW?"
Sharon Elizabeth Rush*
INTRODUCTION
My daughter was only three years old when she asked this question
as I was tucking her into bed one night last year. As soon as I heard
it, I felt a little sick to my stomach, thinking, "What a question," and
wondering how I was going to respond to it in a way that affirmed her
as a biracial child whose biological father is African-American and
whose biological mother is white. I, her adoptive mother, am also
white.
When I first considered adoption, I was told that I was likely to
have a biracial child offered to me because I was single and because
biracial children are hard to place in Florida. I also knew that
* Visiting Professor, Washington College of Law, American University. Professor, Universi-
ty of Florida College of Law. I would like to thank the members of the Connectict Lam Re-
view for inviting me to participate in this symposium. I am especially grateful to Professor Bar-
bara Woodhouse whose insights are reflected throughout this introduction. Finally. Ibtisam Hijazi
read drafts of this article, offering many valuable comments about her experiences as a mother.
1. Typically, potential adoptive parents and children are matched according to various crite-
ria depending on the desires of the parents and the needs of the child. In Florida. applicants
who are married are more "suitable" or attractive as adoptive parents than are single applicants.
Similarly, in Florida. white children are the easiest to place for adoption, followed by Hispanic
children, Hispanic/white children, black children, and black/white children. Thus. because my
daughter and I were both at the bottom of the hierarchies in terms of our "suitability" for the
adoption process, we were a "perfect" match in the eyes of the State and social workers. And
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transracial adoptions are controversial,2 and that raising a biracial child
would be different in many ways. I was prepared to teach my daughter
and learn from her about the differences in our races and cultures. I
also knew on some theoretical level that she and I would have to face
the judgment of people who made an issue out of the differences be-
tween our races.
What I was not prepared for was being so close to the pain she
would experience because she is African-American. As a mother, of
course, I hurt when she hurts. I recall one sunny day when she was
about two, and we were out on a playground. She excitedly ran up to a
swing where another little girl, who was white, was playing. As my
daughter got closer to the swing, the little girl's mother ran over to it,
grabbed her daughter, and took her off the swing. My daughter stopped,
turned around, looked at me and burst into tears.
It seems as if my daughter and I have been working on racial
issues ever since she started talking. I know that before she was three
she made comments like, "I wish I were white like Annie" (her friend).
These kinds of comments would tear me apart, as they still do. They
reflect how hard it is for her to be "different," especially from me, but
also from her grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, and most of her
friends. I try to put her comments into the context of "normal develop-
mental behavior" because, to a certain extent, it is "normal" for a child
to want to be like his or her parent(s), family, and friends.
However, my daughter's comments about race seem to go much
deeper. They seem more like social statements; poignant and insightful
comments about what it is like to be a black toddler in a predominantly
white world. For example, her solution to problems posed by Martin
Luther King's death came from reading "Sleeping Beauty" (a version in
which all of the characters are black). As she was about to fall asleep
(or so I thought), she joyously popped out from under her blanket, sat
up and exclaimed, "I have a good idea. Why don't I go and kiss Mar-
tin Luther King so he can wake up!"
Thus, when -she made the comment about the rainbow, I was not
surprised at the depth of it, but, once again, I was surprised at the pain
it evoked. Fortunately, I quickly realized that white isn't in the rainbow
they were absolutely right-not because of my marital status or my daughter's race-but be-
cause of the deep love we have for each other as mother and daughter.
2. See generally Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong?: The Politics of
Race-Matching in Adoption, in FAMILY MATrERs: READINGS ON FAMILY LIVES AND THE LAW
66 (Martha Minow ed., 1993).
[Vol. 26:1195
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either, so I pointed this out to her. She was silent. During that silence,
I wondered what she was thinking. She probably was just imagining a
rainbow and assessing whether or not I was correct. Since she didn't
offer a retort, I assumed she was satisfied with my response, although
I'll never know whether she was thinking that whites aren't so special
either and that's why white isn't in the rainbow. Somehow, I doubt it.
I begin with the rainbow story for two reasons. First, storytelling in
law is becoming increasingly prevalent and is growing in significance?
It is oie way, a very powerful way, for people who are caught on the
outside of normative standards, like my daughter and me, to explore
and explain how those standards are exclusionary. Equally important,
storytelling makes law less abstract and more contextualized. By being
more contextualized, legal rules become less academic and their effects
more real.
For example, defining "family" becomes less of a theoretical debate
when one's own family unit is different from the traditional married,
middle-class mother and father with their biological children. For non-
traditional families, redefining family takes on enormous practical sig-
nificance. A broader definition of family actually may enable people to
create families. Laws permitting transracial adoptions and surrogacy are
illustrative. Moreover, a broader definition of family provides greater
legal security to non-traditional families. Without such legal protection,
non-traditional families live in fear of traditional laws tearing them
apart.
Significantly, implicit in any definition of family is a notion of
"goodness," 4 which usually gets expressed when a "bad" family re-
minds us of our differences. For example, in In re Doustou,5 a Virgin-
ia state judge recently denied a mother the custody of her young son
because the mother is a lesbian in a committed relationship with anoth-
er woman. This Virginia decision reflects the view held by many that
some families are "bad" and not deserving of legal protection.
3. See generally Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICII. L REV. 2073 (19S9). But see
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories out of School: An Essay on Legal Narra-
tives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993).
4. Professor Marie Ashe has also written extensively on the "good motherboad mother" di-
chotomy. See, eg., Marie Ashe, "Bad Mothers." "Good Lawyers." and "Legal Ethics." 81
GEo. LJ. 2533 (1993); Marie Ashe, The "Bad Mother" in Law and Literature: A Problem of
Representation, 43 HASTINGS U. 947 (1992). See also Martha Albertson Fineman. Our Sacred
Institution: The Ideal of the Family in American Lm and Society. 1993 UTAtt L REV. 387.
5. No. CH93JA0517-00 (Cir. CL of Cry. of Henrico. Va. Sept. 7, 1993) (also referred to as
Bottoms v. Bottoms), rev'd and remanded, 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. CL App. 1994).
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Categorizing families into "good ones" and "bad ones" tends to be
dysfunctional. In terms of family dynamics, the "goodness/badness"
dichotomy is dysfunctional because it inevitably and unnecessarily
breaks bonds between people. From society's view, the emphasis on
"good/bad" families is dysfunctional because it promotes discrimination
against many non-traditional families. Rather than valuing relationships,
this approach values the values of those in positions to define "family."
It allows judges, like the Virginia judge, to discount the importance and
significance of the lesbians' bonds to each other and to their son sim-
ply by condemning homosexuality. 6  The Virginia judge believes that
homosexuality is "bad," that therefore the mother is a "bad" parent, and
that her family unit is "bad." Because everything about this family is
"bad," in his opinion, he is justified in splitting it up. He creates new
"family units" without even asking whether the original family func-
tioned. 7 Significantly, his decision also promotes heterosexual hegemo-
ny.8
Unfortunately, the debate over the definition of family all too often
is carried out in the context of excluding people from a child's life.
And sometimes this is necessary; perhaps extreme cases of abuse pro-
vide the best examples. If only Joshua DeShaney had been taken away
from his father.9 But the debate extends beyond the extremely abusive
parent or even the gay or lesbian parent. It arises in many, many other
contexts as well. What role does and should an abusive parent, a negli-
gent parent, a working parent, a single parent, a surrogate parent, a
grandparent, a foster parent, a step-parent, an adoptive parent, and other
"third parties" play in a child's life? Stated alternatively, just who and
what is a "family"?
The papers in this Symposium reflect the importance of storytelling
and also "play-off" the "good family/bad family" dichotomy that seems
6. To quote the judge, "I will tell you first that the mother's conduct is illegal. It is a
Class 6 felony in the Commonwealth of Virginia. I will tell you that it is the opinion of this
Court that her conduct is immoral . . . and that [her] conduct . . . renders her an unfit parent."
Id. at 4.
7. For a discussion of "functional" families, see Martha Minow, Redefining Families:
Who's in and Who's out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269 (1991).
8. I think two critical factors in the court's decision were testimony that the son had called
his mother's lover "Da Da," and that the two women "kissed and patted" each other in front of
the son. These factors perhaps raised concerns about whether the child was learning "appropri-
ate" gender and sex roles.
9. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). discussed
in Raymond O'Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process Rights of Children Versus Parents.
26 CoNN. L. REv. 1209 (1994).
[Vol. 26:1195
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to drive most of the debate on redefining family. To illustrate, in her
presentation entitled Who in the World is Clarabel Ventura?,' Profes-
sor Marie Ashe told a story about Clarabel Ventura, an Hispanic, sin-
gle, pregnant mother of six children living on welfare. Ms. Ventura and
her family became the focus of the news media because her four-year-
old son's hand was "burned to the bone" when it was immersed in a
bucket of hot water mixed with Drano. Ms. Ventura did not seek im-
mediate medical help for her son, fearing that she would be suspected
of child abuse and would lose custody of him and possibly her other
children as well. Ms. Ventura, who spoke only Spanish, claimed that
she had left the bucket in the bathroom and that her son accidentally
played in it. Officials, in contrast, believed that the child's hands could
get so seriously burned only if they had been forcefully immersed and
held in the bucket. As she feared, state officials charged Ms. Ventura
with child abuse and removed her son and the other children from the
home and placed them in foster care.
Professor Ashe used this story to explore how officials involved in
Ms. Ventura's case, including news media personnel, lawyers, and "hu-
man services" professionals, depicted her as someone who is "not us."
Professor Ashe suggested that this was done by some officials who
characterize Ms. Ventura as so "unimaginably sadistic" that she became
an "other." She was not anyone "we" would know." Interestingly,
other officials who presented Ms. Ventura as a "victim of trauma," in
efforts to rebut the sadistic image, also distanced themselves from her
because she was so victimized by "the system." Thus, from almost all
perspectives, Ms. Ventura became "the other" and the paradigmatic
example of "what's wrong with welfare."
Interestingly, this story highlights some essential aspects of the
debate on custody, which are fleshed out by the other papers in the
Symposium. For example, both Dean Howard Eisenberg and Professor
Raymond O'Brien suggest, at least implicitly, that the concept of family
should be a narrow one. Although neither author expressly rejects a
concept of family that might include non-traditional families, both seem
to imply that family is and should be exclusive-however it is defined.
A dramatic illustration of this is Dean Eisenberg's suggestion, in A
10. Marie Ashe, Presentation to the Connecticut Law Review Symposium. Solomon's Dilem-
ma: Exploring Parental Rights (Mar. 1. 1994) (transcript available at the Connecticut Law
Review).
11. Id.
1994]
HeinOnline  -- 26 Conn. L. Rev. 1199 1993-1994
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
Modest Proposal: State Licensing of Parents,'2 that anyone who wish-
es to become a parent be required to first obtain a state license. As an
adoptive parent who is licensed by the state, I am a bit suspicious
about the correlation between meeting licensing requirements and being
a "good" parent. Generally, to secure a license under Dean Eisenberg's
proposal, one must be a graduate of a mandatory course on child care
and be financially able to provide for a child. Significantly, if an appli-
cant is HIV positive, or a drug addict, or an alcoholic, then he or she
is disqualified. Applicants who have been convicted of certain crimes
(of violence, child abuse, spousal abuse, drug distribution, child neglect,
or non-support), and applicants who have been involuntary committed
to mental hospitals would be presumptively denied licenses. They could
overcome the presumption by presenting "clear and convincing evi-
dence" of their rehabilitation to the juvenile court.
Many people might agree that it would be "good" for parents to be
"educated" about child care matters. Whether "good" parents can be
produced through educational programs is an open question. Moreover,
many, many people who become parents without a licensing scheme ap-
pear to be "good" at it. Similarly, that some applicants might be able to
provide financially for a child does not mean that they would be
"good" parents, or that someone who has less financial means would be
a "bad" parent. Admittedly, being knowledgeable about child care and
having the financial means to obtain necessities and luxuries for one's
child make it easier to parent, and correspondingly, make it easier to
appear to be a good parent. We must be careful to remember, however,
that the quality of one's parenting abilities is more accurately measured
by the mutual love, affection, and respect between the parent and child.
Moreover, eliminating from the field of potential parents all people
who do not meet the licensing requirements is a dramatic way for the
government to participate in the debate on family. The constitutionality
of such a proposal is seriously in doubt. Even if such a scheme were to
pass constitutional muster, consideration must be given to its fundamen-
tal effect on those who fail to qualify as parents and on society as a
whole.
Consider adoption and foster parenting, which are licensing
schemes. Gays and lesbians are disfavored as adoptive and foster par-
ents. Transracial adoptions are quite controversial and generally discour-
aged except as a last resort. For example, I suspect that I was approved
12. 26 CoNN. L. REV. 1415 (1994).
[Vol. 26:11951200
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as an adoptive parent because the adoption agency and the state needed
me to take a "special needs" child. In Florida, biracial children are
considered "special needs" children because they are so difficult to
place.
By enabling my daughter and me to become a family, albeit a non-
traditional one, the adoption agency and the state were able to perpetu-
ate a racial, class, and heterosexual caste system that by-and-large pro-
motes dominant values. White babies are placed with married, white
couples; black babies are placed with married, black couples, and so
on. The value preferences built into the licensing scheme reflect domi-
nant cultural preferences about what a "good" family is. Under this
view, it was unlikely that anyone but a middle class, white, single
woman (they also try to match by sex if the parent is single) would be
interested in adopting a black/white baby girl. It was equally unlikely
that a black/white baby girl was likely to be placed with anyone else.
Officials decided that under the circumstances, my daughter and I
would be a "good" match.
In addition, the inherent biases against me as a single parent also
made it more attractive for me to agree to accept a child who was
harder to place, either because of race or mental or physical conditions
that would require special attention. As a caveat, of course, I have
always thought it somewhat odd that a single parent, who has less time
to spend with a child because of work demands, is nevertheless consid-
ered a "good" match for a child with "special needs." In any event, I
was "good enough" to adopt a child with "special needs," but I wasn't
"good enough" to adopt a child that a married couple might want. My
daughter became a part of my family because I was the "best" choice
at the time. It is a matter of good fortune that my preferences coincid-
ed with the state's. Other applicants, however, might find the matching
policies so objectionable that they voluntarily drop out of the process or
are involuntarily screened out of the process as "unsuitable."
Thus, like the Virginia decision in Bottoms that promotes heterosex-
ual hegemony, a parental licensing scheme would promote many, if not
most, dominant cultural values to the exclusion of people who fall
outside normative standards. Ms. Ventura might be an excellent parent,
who, giving her the benefit of the doubt, acted negligently in one in-
stance toward her son. Because she is on welfare, however, she would
be ineligible to receive a parental license under Dean Eisenberg's pro-
posal. Similarly, someone who is HIV positive, or someone who is an
alcoholic, especially if they are reformed, can be a loving and caring
parent, but would be denied the opportunity. Significantly, a dispropor-
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tionate number of people on welfare are women and people of color.
People with disabilities, such as AIDS, drug addiction, and alcoholism,
also tend to be marginalized in our society. A parental licensing
scheme, no matter how well-intentioned it is, inevitably will promote
discrimination and marginalization of those people who are already
outside the dominant groups.
More subtly, Professor O'Brien also narrows the definition of fami-
ly by suggesting it should be easier to terminate parental rights by
lowering the burden of proof from "clear and convincing" to a "prepon-
derance of the evidence" test in proceedings to terminate parental rights.
In his paper, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process Rights of Children
Versus Parents,13 he suggests that lowering the standard to make it
easier to exclude parents from a child's life evidences a stronger com-
mitment to acting in a child's best interest.
Consideration should be given in custody decisions to what the
child needs and wants. Perhaps this seems obvious, but watching
Jessica DeBoer's agony in being taken away from her adoptive parents
is a reminder that in some jurisdictions the child's wants and needs can
be superseded by more traditional views on parental rights. In that case,
biological connections of the "natural" parents with Jessica trumped
Jessica's psychological connections with her prospective adoptive par-
ents. Significantly, relevant family law in the DeBoer case did not even
allow the judge to consider the interests of Jessica. This was an intoler-
able injustice to Jessica and other adopted children, particularly those
who were mature enough to watch the story unfold and wonder about
the security of their own placements. 4 Moreover, even when the
"child's best interest standard" is invoked in custody disputes, it is not
always clear what it means.1
5
What is clear, however, is that the arguments used to support a
custody decision under the child's best interest standard or any other
standard, like the licensing scheme, reflect value judgments. Generally,
the values that win out in custody decisions are those represented by
dominant groups. Thus, perhaps it matters less whether the standard for
terminating parental rights is "clear and convincing" or "preponderance
of the evidence." Either standard is likely to be met if the judge is
13. 26 CONN. L. REV. 1209 (1994).
14. This consideration was brought to my attention by an unidentified audience participant in
a symposium on family at the Washington College of Law, American University, April 9, 1994.
15. See Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and
the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REv. 11, 53 (1994).
[Vol. 26:1195
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persuaded that the parent's rights should be terminated. As Professor
Ashe suggested, Ms. Ventura was likely to have her son taken away
from her because of the inherent race, sex, ethnic, and class biases
disfavoring her as a single, Hispanic, poor mother. Professor Ashe
acknowledged that if her son had suffered similar injuries, she would
have taken him immediately to the pediatrician, knowing that her pedia-
trician would be inclined to think it was an accident.' 6 That Professor
Ashe, a white law professor, might abuse her child would probably be
a distant concern, if it was a concern at all. It certainly would not be
the immediate assumption made about Professor Ashe, as it was about
Ms. Ventura.
Dean Eisenberg's and Professor O'Brien's proposals highlight the
reality that our society does not focus enough attention and resources
on children and families at the margin or who are in some kind of
trouble. Dr. Albert Solnit, in his commentary on the day of the Sympo-
sium, was correct that a licensing scheme is not only unrealistic, but
also a very unappealing way to deal with the problems facing many
children and families. He suggests that only in a non-free society would
such a scheme be supported. Rather than attempt to attain "quality
control" in families by regulating who gets to become a parent, perhaps
we should focus more on trying to keep existing, functioning families
together and to ensuring that they have adequate means to become and
remain healthy family units. Dean Eisenberg's and Professor O'Brien's
proposals should make us ask: "What can be done about poverty, rac-
ism, sexism, homophobia, and classism, so that all of our children and
their families can participate equally in our democratic society?"
Although there is no clear answer to this question, it seems impera-
tive that if we, as a society, are truly committed to our children, then
we must begin to see the world from their perspectives. 7 As another
Symposium commentator, Professor Barbara Woodhouse, suggested, we
must ask what it means for a child to be separated from the only par-
ent he or she has ever known. What does it mean to a child for some-
one to be that child's "mother" or "father" or "parental figure?" When
we ask, "Who in the world is Clarabel Ventura?," I suggest that at
least six people know very well who she is. She is their mother. All
too often, as lawyers, we get carried away with the legal issues18 and
16. See generally Ashe, supra note 10.
17. Id.
18. Professor and Clinician Suellyn Scarnachia represented the DeBoers in their battle to
adopt Jessica. Professor Scarnachia related publicly how even she could not think of Mrs.
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forget to look at what Professor Ann Scales calls the "moral crux of
the matter."'9
Thus, in her paper, The "Intent" of Reproduction: Reproductive
Technologies and the Parent-Child Bond,20 Professor Janet Dolgin ex-
plores how current analysis in custody disputes in some jurisdictions
seems to be shifting from a heavy reliance on biological connections to
a greater reliance on the adults' intent in becoming parents. For exam-
ple, she relates the story of a married couple who wanted to have a
baby, but for medical reasons the wife could not carry a child to term.
They entered into a contract with another woman, the "gestational
mother," to have her carry their fertilized egg until the baby was born.
At birth, the parties all agreed and understood that the gestational moth-
er would "surrender" the baby to the married couple. A few months
before the baby was due, the gestational mother found that she was
unable to follow through on her agreement. She had become so emo-
tionally, physically, and psychologically attached to the baby that she
felt it was "hers." Litigation ensued.2'
In trying to resolve the classic Solomon's Dilemma, "Who is this
baby's mother?," the role of biological ties to the child became ambigu-
ous in the court's eyes. In reality, all three adults had some "biological
interest" in the baby, although the court depicted the problem as one
arising between the "two mothers." Alternatively, the court decided to
look to the "intent" of the parties, "Which woman intended to bring
about the birth of the child?," asked the court. This woman, in the
court's opinion, would be the baby's "natural" mother. Not surprisingly,
the married woman was awarded custody of the baby. Many might
agree, including myself as an adoptive parent, that less reliance on
traditional rules about biological relatedness in family law is healthy
and encouraging. Professor Ruthann Robson, for example, explores in
DeBoer as Jessica's "real" mother because she felt she needed to stay focused on the legal
issues in order to zealously represent them. Throughout the litigation process, Mrs. DeBoer
would often meet with Professor Scamachia and bring Jessica along. It was only when Mrs.
DeBoer visited Professor Scarnachia's house for a meeting and came without Jessica that Profes-
sor Scarnachia realized that Mrs. DeBoer was Jessica's mother. At that moment, Professor
Scamachia realized how tragically abstract and theoretical the entire case had become. Suellyn
Scamachia, Remarks at the Washington College of Law, American University, Symposium, Gen-
der, Family & Chance: Developments in the Legal Regulation of Family Life (April 9, 1994).
19. Ann Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373,
1378 (1986).
20. 26 CONN. L. REv. 1261 (1994).
21. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
[Vol. 26:1195
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her paper, Third Parties and the Third Sex: Child Custody and Lesbian
Legal Theory,"2 how reliance on biological relatedness in determining
family law dynamics promotes patriarchy and heterosexual hegemony.
Many gay men and lesbians are unable to reproduce within the tradi-
tional framework for understanding and analyzing reproductive rights
and family law? 3 For many non-traditional families, then, a move
away from biology is a welcome relief.
This is not to suggest that biology is unimportant or insignificant.
Many people want and need to reproduce within a traditional family
and our Constitution rightfully protects those choices. In fact, Professors
Karen Czapanskiy and Madeleine Kurtz suggest that while the biologi-
cal connections between parent and child are important, the importance
of biological connections between other relatives and the child tend to
be devalued or overlooked. Their papers highlight the complexity of
defining family and the inherent weaknesses in relying too heavily
either on biological ties between the parent and child, or on formal
contract principles.
For example, in her article, The Purchase of Families into Foster
Care: Two Case Studies and the Lessons They Teach, 4 Professor
Kurtz relates the story of Nora and her granddaughter, Evelyn. The
moment Evelyn was born she was a cocaine addict just like her mother.
Child welfare workers filed a neglect petition against the mother, alleg-
ing that her drug addiction rendered her unfit to care for Evelyn. The
court agreed, and temporarily placed Evelyn in foster care with Nora
while the mother received drug treatment. Over the next several years,
the mother's drug rehabilitation efforts failed, and welfare officials
.began to consider terminating her rights and placing Evelyn for adop-
tion with Nora. Although the idea of adopting her granddaughter
seemed strange and unnecessary to Nora, she agreed to the officials'
plan. The mother's rights were terminated, which had the concomitant
legal effect of rendering Nora solely a foster mother and not Evelyn's
grandmother.
On the one hand, it was easy and somewhat logical to define
Nora's and Evelyn's relationship in contractual terms; they were foster
mother and foster child. By becoming Evelyn's foster mother and the
state's agent, Nora became entitled to the much needed corresponding
22. 26 CONN. L. REv. 1377 (1994).
23. Sharon E. Rush, Breaking with Tradition: Surrogacy and Gay Fathers, in KINDRED MAT-
TERS: REHINKING TIE PHILOSOPHY OF TE FAMILY 102 (D. Meyers et al. eds.. 1993).
24. 26 CONN. L. REv. 1453 (1994).
1994]
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financial benefits. Simultaneously, however, once she became the offi-
cial foster parent, her significance as Evelyn's biological grandmother
became so attenuated that it eventually became irrelevant. When the
state suspected that Nora had a "drinking problem," it was all too easy
for it to terminate her as a foster parent. Because the state deemed her
"unfit" to be a foster parent, Nora was not allowed to take care of
Evelyn. Without her mother or her grandmother to parent Evelyn, the
state began to consider placing her for adoption with a stranger. Nora
and Evelyn faced the real possibility that their relationship would be
terminated for life, and that Evelyn would lose all contact with her
extended family.
Most people who are concerned about children and child custody
issues realize that because Nora might no longer be "good enough" to
qualify as a foster parent in the state's eyes, it should not necessarily
mean that she no longer has any right to be involved in Evelyn's life.
Terminating the contractual relationship between the state and the foster
grandmother proved too facile a resolution. Not only did it ignore the
role Nora played as Evelyn's biological grandmother, it also ignored the
importance to Evelyn of maintaining ties with her biological kin-those
people who also represented her psychological and emotional family.
Nora's and Evelyn's story remind us once again that strict application
of legal rules can often lead to unsatisfactory, harsh, and even tragic
results.
Professor Czapanskiy's article, Grandparents, Parents, and Grand-
children: Actualizing Interdependency in Law,2 approaches the prob-
lem of giving grandparents more legal protection in their relationships
with their grandchildren from the perspective of coguardianship. Specifi-
cally, she explores the growing trend among some parents and grand-
parents to assume co-responsibility for a child. Under current law, how-
ever, a grandparent who is a "coguardian" with a child's parent has
virtually no legal standing to act as a "co-parent." The grandparent who
acts as a guardian without state sanction or parental permission has no
legal authority to seek medical care for the child, or make other signifi-
cant decisions that a parent often makes on behalf of a child. Thus, to
protect their status as coguardians, grandparents are forced to sue their
children or have them declared unfit and have their own status as
coguardian grandparents legally sanctioned. In an effort to surmount
some of the inherent difficulties in giving legal protection to grandpar-
25. 26 CONN. L. REv. 1315 (1994).
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ents who maintain "parent-like" relationships with their grandchildren,
Professor Czapanskiy suggests that law recognize the validity of
coguardianship contracts.
Professor Czapanskiy's idea also should motivate those who are
concerned about family and custody issues to think about the role of
contracts in other contexts. For example, although Nora and her daugh-
ter were not actually "coguardians" of Evelyn, it is worth exploring if
they nevertheless could have benefitted from a guardianship-type con-
tract between the mother and Nora. The mother who risks losing her
parental status may very well find the shifting of legal authority over
her child to kin an attractive alternative. I suspect that Nora would have
had no reservations about assuming guardianship over Evelyn without
becoming an official foster mother. In fact, if she had not needed the
foster care benefits that go along with being a foster parent, we must
ask whether she would have wanted the state involved at all. Taking
care of Evelyn may have been the natural thing for her to do. Of
course, if Nora were unable to assume the role of guardian and that
contract had to be terminated, it does not follow, as it seems to in the
foster care situation, that she also would have to be cut out of Evelyn's
life.
Professors Czapanskiy and Kurtz motivate us to think of an answer
to this question: What can be done, legally and socially, to strengthen
the bonds among Evelyn, Nora, and Evelyn's mother so that they can
function as a healthy family?
Doing what is right for our children is not easy. Families defined
by factors other than biology merely argue that they, too, deserve con-
stitutional protection, and that biology should not be the controlling or
even dominant consideration in defining or creating families or in re-
solving custody disputes.
Similarly, even though biological ties between parent and child are
important, we must also begin to recognize the significance of other
biological relatives. More importantly, a shift away from the biological
ties between parent and child to other biological relatives or to some
other measure, like intent or contract, does not necessarily obviate the
inherent biases in custody disputes. For example, I think it is extremely
relevant in the story told by Professor Dolgin that the married couple is
a white man and an Asian woman, and that the gestational mother is
African-American. Like potential adoptive parents in Florida where
African-American and African-American/white children are the "least
desirable" children to adopt, perhaps this court felt the same way about
19941
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the gestational mother. As Cornel West reminds us, "race matters. 26
At a minimum, attention should be given to the racial overtones of the
decision.
Thus, just as a standard for resolving custody disputes that relies on
biology can promote hegemony in many ways, so, too, can other stan-
dards, like "child's best interest," or "intent." When decisionmakers
become aware of the value preferences in their decisions, we, as a
society, will begin to focus on the problems posed by racism, sexism,
homophobia, classism, and poverty. When we make this transition,
perhaps we will be more understanding of what family means to some
people who are marginalized in our society and will begin to redefine
family in ways that value them.
26. CORNEL WEST, RACE MATIERS (1993).
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